Increased research attention is being devoted to the influence of corporate board members on important organizational outcomes. According to agency theorists, effective boards independently monitor strategic challenges facing the firm and evaluate management's performance in addressing them (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Beatty & Zajac, 1994) . Directors may overturn poor decisions or replace under-performing managers as a result of such monitoring (Brudney, 1982) . Moreover, while agency theorists emphasize the board's role as an independent control mechanism, the broader literature on boards suggests a second possible role for directors; specifically, in some cases they may provide ongoing advice to top managers on possible strategic changes or the implementation of existing strategies (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Demb & Neubauer, 1992) . In such cases, boards serve as a strategic consultant to top managers, rather than (or in addition to) exercising independent control. This view was advanced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 170) , who identified the provision of advice and counsel and the exercise of control as two primary components of the board's internal administrative function.
The literature on boards also suggests that there is considerable variance in the degree to which they make an actual impact on strategic decision making, with some boards unable to monitor or advise management effectively (Mace, 1971; Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990) .
Prior empirical studies have focused primarily on lack of board power as an explanation for limited board involvement. For example, it is often proposed that boards are less likely to exert control over strategic decision making on behalf of shareholders when they lack formal or social independence from management --as indicated by the percentage of outside or non-executive directors, or the prevalence of friendship ties or other social connections between managers and directors (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Hill & Snell, 1988; Kesner, Victor, & Lamont, 1986; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Wade et al., 1990 ).
More recently, several authors have noted the persistent challenges faced by directors in making meaningful contributions to corporate strategy, regardless of their power to do so (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Westphal & Zajac, 1997) . Such challenges have been held to stem in part from questions of whether many directors have suitable knowledge or information to contribute meaningfully to strategy. For instance, it has been repeatedly suggested that outside directors are often inadequately prepared to participate in board discussions because their time and attention is divided and diluted by their other board appointments; by serving on boards at multiple companies, they have difficulty gaining an adequate understanding of the issues facing any one firm. For these reasons, proponents of governance reform have strongly advocated limits to the number of boards upon which directors may sit (Business Week, 1997) .
While a number of empirical studies have examined how board power and independence affect policy outcomes, very little research has sought to identify factors that determine whether boards have adequate knowledge and information to make meaningful contributions to strategic decision making. Moreover, research has not addressed the specific question of how multiple board appointments affect directors' ability to contribute to strategy. To address these questions, we develop a sociocognitive perspective on how director appointments to other boards affect the capability of board members to monitor and advise management in the strategic decision making process. We test our theoretical perspective with a unique data set that combines archival reports with primary, behavioral data obtained through surveys of Forbes 1000 outside directors and CEOs. The theoretical perspective and empirical analysis presented here may help answer recent calls for research that examines the "substantive context" of board appointments (Nohria, 1992: 14) , and moves our understanding beyond the simple number of such appointments or director independence as predictors of board influence and decision making (Mizruchi, 1996; Pettigrew, 1992; Stinchcombe, 1990) .
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Director Appointments and Board Involvement in Strategic Decision Making
The sociocognitive perspective developed in this study suggests the importance of directors' network of appointments to other boards in determining whether they have the appropriate strategic knowledge and perspective to monitor and advise management in the strategic decision making process. As noted above, critics of corporate governance have typically argued that directors' appointments to other boards reduce their ability to contribute to decision making at the focal board. Such an argument assumes that knowledge and perspective gained on other boards are largely irrelevant to decision making at the focal firm. In contrast, our sociocognitive perspective indicates how experience on other boards can enhance or diminish directors' ability to contribute to strategy, by focusing their attention on relevant strategic issues.
The sociocognitive perspective on organizational decision making suggests that individuals cope with complex decision making tasks by relying upon the schemata or "knowledge structures" they have developed about their environment (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Walsh, 1995) . In the absence of complete information, or given uncertainty regarding the relevance of different pieces of information, individuals tend to follow a top-down or theorydriven approach to decision making, rather than a bottom-up or data-driven approach based on present information (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Abelson & Black, 1986; Ocasio, 1997) . Given the extreme information complexity facing directors in evaluating strategic decisions (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) , they can be expected to rely heavily upon the implicit theories they have developed regarding corporate strategy and the competitive environment. Moreover, from this perspective, the knowledge structures that individuals use to cope with information processing demands are developed from experience in a similar role (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Walsh, 1995) .
In our framework, directors are likely to use knowledge structures developed from their experience on other boards. The literature on interlocking directorates supports this view. This work demonstrates how the involvement of directors on other boards provides an important source of information about business practices and policies (cf., Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993) . For example, Useem (1982) observed that executives use their board appointments as a way to scan the environment for timely and pertinent information. He quotes several executives who suggest that board appointments provide a vehicle for learning: i.e., "direct involvement in other companies' affairs replaces an awful lot of reading…it's a hell of a tool for top management education" (1982: 209-210) . Similarly, directors can learn about the efficacy of different practices and how to implement them properly by observing the consequences of management decisions (Haunschild, 1993) . Such learning is particularly vivid because directors observe the decision making process first-hand in their monitoring role, participate actively by giving advice to management, and then witness the consequences of those decisions.
Directors also learn about business practices through their communication with other directors in board and committee meetings. Information acquired from fellow directors may be particularly influential because it often comes from a trusted source (Useem, 1982; Davis, 1991; Weick, 1995) . This information is typically more timely and up-to-date than that derived from secondary sources, and it may also be more salient due to its recency (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982) . Thus, a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement emphasizes how directors' social structural context, including their ties to other boards, provides direct strategic experience and indirect access to strategic information through social contact with other directors, which in turn can critically inform the knowledge structures used to monitor decisions or give advice on the focal board. 1 In the following section, we further develop our sociocognitive perspective to consider variation in the strategic context of director ties to other boards, in order to address whether and when such ties provide relevant strategic knowledge and perspective for monitoring and advising management of the focal firm.
Environmental Stability and Director Involvement in Strategic Decision Making
Related board ties and involvement in stable environments. Environmental stability refers to the extent to which a firm's competitive environment is complex, uncertain, and prone to strategic change (Huber & McDaniel, 1986) . It is emphasized here because such stability is a key determinant of the particular strategic issues facing a firm and its top management (Duncan, 1972; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) . Accordingly, the level of stability versus turbulence in the 1 There is qualitative evidence (Useem, 1993) and some large-sample empirical evidence (Westphal and Zajac, 1997) suggesting that board norms shifted during the late 1980s and early 1990s toward increased involvement in strategic decision making. Moreover, although some research has claimed that boards had little involvement in strategy in the 1960s through the early 1980s (Herman, 1981; Mace, 1971) , Mizruchi (1983) questioned such claims and provided several examples of board activism from that period as well.
environment may be an important factor in determining how directors can contribute to strategic decision making. Theory and research on environmental turbulence and strategic decision making distinguishes between two basic strategic issues in the decision making process --the development of new strategies and the implementation of existing strategies --and suggests that in stable environments the latter issue is relatively more important: if there is less change in the environment, there is less need to regularly identify new strategic alternatives in order to maintain fit with the environment, so that firms in stable environments are more likely to compete primarily through the better implementation of existing strategies (Andrews, 1971; Fredrickson, 1984; Ginsberg, 1990; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) explicitly recognize board monitoring of strategy implementation as an important component of the board's obligation to protect shareholders.
How then might directors' ties to other boards enhance their ability to monitor and advise management on the implementation of existing strategies (i.e., in stable environments)? We suggest that directors will be better able to contribute to strategy in such environments to the extent that their board ties are strategically related to the focal firm. Strategically related board ties refer to a director's appointments to boards of other companies that follow similar corporate strategies and operate in similar product-market and international-market contexts. Given that such ties enable directors to observe first-hand the experiences of other firms in implementing similar strategies, they provide directors with a more sophisticated understanding of the combination of systems and structures needed for successful implementation of the firm's strategy. Moreover, strategically related board ties also help directors acquire relevant knowledge through social interaction with other directors in board and committee meetings, as board members evaluate management and raise ideas and suggestions for better strategy implementation.
From a sociocognitive perspective, these social connections and opportunities for vicarious learning can lead to more highly developed knowledge structures for implementing the focal firm's strategy. Research on sociocognition has shown that individuals who have experience concentrated in a related domain, rather than dispersed across different contexts, have more highly developed knowledge structures for that domain, with less schema categories and more information units per category (Lurigio & Carroll, 1985; Sujan, Sujan, & Bettman, 1988; Day & Lord, 1992) . As a result, individuals engaging in problem solving for domains (e.g., strategies) where they have concentrated experience not only have more information at their disposal, but that information is also structured more efficiently, and this leads to faster and more accurate information processing (Day & Lord, 1992) .
In addition, while related board ties can provide relevant strategic knowledge and information, they may also enable directors to communicate that knowledge to managers more efficiently. The top management team literature, which is often rooted in sociocognition (Walsh, 1995) , suggests that similar backgrounds and experiences result in common perspectives on strategy, which in turn allows for more efficient communication among decision makers (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; O'Reilly, Snyder & Boothe, 1993) . Thus, when directors have experience with related strategies through their ties to other boards, such related experience should lead to more efficient communication, which can facilitate collective problem solving in the implementation process.
Taken together, to the extent that firms in stable environments compete primarily through better implementation of existing strategies (i.e., rather than identifying new strategies to fit a changing environment), strategically related board ties should enhance directors' ability to contribute to strategic decision making in stable environments. This suggests several related hypotheses. The first hypothesis considers the effect of an individual director's appointments to other boards on the board member's perceived ability to contribute to the focal board. Based on the theoretical argument developed above, in relatively stable environments an individual director involved with other firms following similar strategies to the focal firm is likely to be better equipped to provide relevant information and advice to managers and directors on the focal board. Thus, as hypothesized below, they may consequently perceive themselves to be better able to contribute to strategic decision making:
H1: In stable environments, a director's board appointments to other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm will increase the director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions of strategic issues.
Two additional hypotheses consider how the combined board-level portfolio of all directors' appointments can affect actual board-level behavior. As discussed above, boards may contribute to strategic decision making by regularly monitoring the decision making process, as suggested by agency theorists, or by providing advice to top managers on strategic issues. The theoretical perspective developed here suggests that in stable environments, board appointments to other strategically related firms should enhance the board's capacity to contribute to strategic decision making. As summarized in the following two hypotheses, this may occur through increased monitoring activity, or provision of more advice to management on strategic issues:
H2: In stable environments, directors' board appointments to other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm will increase the level of board monitoring of strategic decision making.
H3: In stable environments, directors' board appointments to other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm will increase the level of board advice-giving on strategic issues.
Heterogeneous board ties and involvement in unstable environments. As noted above, unstable environments are characterized by a relatively high level of unpredictable change or volatility (Aldrich, 1979; Duncan, 1972; Sharfman & Dean, 1991) . In such environments, organizational success often depends on the ability of top managers to identify new strategic alternatives that maintain the organization's fit with its changing environment (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) . Thus, instability places considerable information processing demands on corporate leaders (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Priem, 1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) . Consequently, they must not only attend to the current strategy, but they must also recognize when and how that strategy should be changed.
Our sociocognitive perspective suggests that in turbulent environments, directors' ability to contribute to strategy is enhanced by a combination of strategically related board ties and ties to firms that follow different strategies from the focal firm. As in stable environments, board involvement with similar companies provides information and knowledge that can enhance a director's ability to monitor the firm's current strategy. Moreover, board ties to similar companies can also help a director stay abreast of changes in the business environment.
However, board involvement with companies following different strategies, and operating in different business environments typically provides directors with greater knowledge and perspective about a broader range of potential strategic alternatives. As discussed above, our perspective suggests that board ties to firms with related strategies can provide first-hand experience and indirect information through social contact with other directors that leads to more highly developed knowledge structures related to implementing the firm's current strategy. At the same time, research has also shown that well-developed knowledge structures can hinder effective information processing outside an individual's area of expertise. For instance, individuals with more concentrated exposure to a particular problem-solving approach or strategy are less likely to notice or consider alternative approaches (Goia, 1986; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Ocasio, 1997) . Thus, when directors' other appointments are concentrated among similar companies, they are less likely to notice strategic alternatives emerging in other environments. In effect, directors' schemata for major strategic alternatives should be highly focused on a limited range of options.
Similarly, the social cohesion perspective on network ties suggests that if directors' board appointments are highly concentrated among firms with very similar strategies, they are more likely to become socialized into accepting the current strategy (Burt, 1987; Palmer et al., 1993) .
Social network ties, including board interlock ties, channel social influence as well as information (Burt, 1987; Davis, 1991; Walker, 1985) . Thus, through their participation in monitoring implementation of similar strategies at other firms, directors with strategically related board ties should tend to develop beliefs that justify those strategies and accept them as appropriate. As a result, when external appointments are largely concentrated among firms with strategies similar to the focal firm, this similarity may reinforce existing managerial commitment to the current strategy and lead directors to ignore environmental changes that threaten its longterm viability.
Thus, in turbulent environments, directors can benefit from interlock ties that expose them to possible strategic alternatives. Such ties effectively broaden the schemata or knowledge structures that directors use in monitoring and advising management, so that boards are not only more likely to identify appropriate strategic alternatives to the current strategy, but they are also more willing to change the current strategy in order to maintain the organization's fit with its changing environment. In effect, board ties to firms with different strategies can help avoid or counteract excessive managerial commitment to the firm's current strategy (Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993; Weick, 1995) . This perspective is consistent with the top management team literature, and the larger literature on group decision making, which suggests that exposure to different beliefs about means-ends relationships (i.e., different beliefs about what strategies lead to high performance) through greater diversity of backgrounds and experience can facilitate adaptation in turbulent environments by stimulating debate about the appropriateness of the current strategy and about the feasibility of strategic alternatives (Boeker, 1997; Bourgeois, 1980; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Williams & O'Reilly, 1997) .
Alternatively, when director appointments are concentrated among strategically dissimilar firms, with very few board ties to firms following similar strategies, the board may lack sufficient expertise to monitor the firm's current strategy or to assess the organizational implications of abandoning the strategy. Indeed, a common dilemma facing many firms is how to develop new strategies while simultaneously implementing current strategies (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987; Porter, 1998) . Therefore, in unstable environments an optimal portfolio of outsider board appointments may include a heterogeneous mix of ties to strategically similar and dissimilar firms (i.e., firms with similar and dissimilar strategies to those of the focal firm). Such heterogeneity is likely to wed the knowledge and expertise requisite to monitor on-going implementation of the current strategy with information and advice about possible strategic alternatives that would allow the firm to maintain fit with its changing environment (Ginsberg, 1990) ; moreover, the diversity of experience associated with heterogeneous board ties can stimulate debate that leads directors and managers to question whether change is needed (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Williams & O'Reilly, 1997) . Consequently, to the extent that an individual director's board ties complement the ties of other directors with respect to strategic relatedness, the director should be better able to contribute to the board. According to this logic, for instance, a director with many board appointments to strategically dissimilar firms is particularly valuable to the focal board if the ties of other directors are concentrated among strategically similar firms. Thus:
H4: In unstable environments, the greater the extent to which a director's board appointments to other firms complement the appointments of other directors in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the greater the director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions of strategic issues.
Paralleling the development of hypotheses H2 and H3, two additional hypotheses address how board-level ties may affect actual board behaviors in unstable environments. The theoretical argument developed above would suggest that in such environments, boards with a heterogeneous mix of links to both strategically different and strategically similar firms, should be better able to contribute to strategic decision making. Therefore, it is hypothesized below that heterogeneous appointments will be reflected in either increased monitoring activity or frequent advice to management on strategic issues.
H5: In unstable environments, the greater the extent to which directors' board appointments are heterogeneous in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the higher the level of board monitoring of strategic decision making.
H6: In unstable environments, the greater the extent to which directors' board appointments are heterogeneous in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the higher the level of board advice-giving on strategic issues.
RESEARCH METHOD Sample and Data Collection
The sample frame for this study consisted of 600 large-and medium-sized companies randomly selected from the Forbes 1000 index of U.S. industrial and service firms. In order to gauge behavioral processes that characterize board involvement in strategic decision making, a questionnaire survey was sent to all 600 CEOs from these companies. In addition, to assess director perceptions about their involvement, a second survey was sent to all individuals serving as outside director at a company where the CEO had responded to the first survey (N=1,312 directors). The surveys were distributed in April of 1995.
While surveys have been used frequently to measure behavioral processes at lower levels of the organization, surveys of top managers have often suffered from low response rates (e.g., less than 25%). To ensure the highest possible response in this case, the following steps were taken (Forsythe, 1977; Fowler, 1993; Groves, Cialdini, & Couper, 1992) : 1) An in-depth pre-test was used to streamline the survey, making it easier and more appealing to complete (see further discussion below); 2) requests for participation linked the current study with an ongoing series of surveys on top management issues conducted by a major business school (to which hundreds of their peers had responded), emphasized the need for research on CEO/board relations, and engaged respondents' natural interest in the topic (see Groves et al., 1992) ; 3) about twenty-one days after the initial mailing, non-respondents were sent a second letter with a new questionnaire.
In total, 263 CEOs and 564 outside directors responded, representing response rates of 44% and 43%, respectively. These response rates are high in comparison to those of other top management surveys (cf., Pettigrew, 1992) . Data on diversification, internationalization, or board interlocks were unavailable for thirty-five of the responding companies; thus, survey data from 228 CEOs and 492 outside directors are used in the analyses, which represents 38% of all CEOs and directors in the sample frame (i.e., on average, the final sample includes 2.2 directors per company in the CEO survey).
To check for non-response bias, archival data were collected for companies in the larger sample frame. For the 531 companies with complete data, we examined whether respondents and non-respondents differed significantly on several different variables derived from archival sources using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) . This test assesses whether significant differences exist in the distribution of respondents and nonrespondents for a given variable, including differences in central tendency, dispersion, skewness, etc. The results of this test provide consistent evidence across multiple variables that respondents and non-respondents come from the same population. Moreover, separate analyses also showed that directors in the survey sample are representative of directors in the larger sample frame (i.e., all outside directors at the 531 companies for which complete archival data were available) with respect to (1) the independent variables (e.g., relatedness of the individual director's board ties), and (2) director characteristics included as control variables in the study (e.g., management experience, education level, tenure on the board, and functional background).
Thus, it appears that sample selection bias is not present in the data.
Data on board interlocks, director characteristics, ownership, and board structure were 
Dependent Measures
Data for our three dependent variables, directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions, board monitoring, and board advice giving were gathered through surveys. To enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, a pre-test was conducted involving indepth pilot interviews with twenty-two top managers and board members (cf., Fowler, 1993: 102) . Following Judge & Zeithaml (1992) , strategic issues were defined in the questionnaire as nonroutine, resource allocation decisions that should affect the performance of the organization.
We further sought to develop survey questions that would assess the board's involvement in either implementation or the consideration of new strategies. We used feedback from participants in the pre-test to ensure that the items would capture both areas of strategic issue involvement, and included additional questions in the survey that focus on each area of involvement. After completing the pilot questionnaire, each individual was asked to identify questions that were unclear, difficult to answer, or potentially subject to bias. These interviews were also used to ensure that questions were interpreted as expected, to identify improvements to the format of the survey, and to modify its length. To reduce response bias, multiple response formats were used, and items measuring each construct were scattered throughout the survey (DeVellis, 1991). Moreover, questions were carefully worded to minimize the likelihood of social desirability bias, using input from the pilot interviews.
Director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions was measured with a multi-item scale in the director survey. Specific items in this scale assess the degree to which directors perceive that they have sufficient knowledge on relevant strategic issues to contribute to board discussions, and the degree to which they feel adequately prepared to contribute.
Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .88, suggesting acceptable inter-item reliability (Nunnally, 1978) . Factor analysis was applied to the survey items using the iterated principal factors method. A scree test indicated one common factor, and promax rotation verified that all items loaded on the same factor as expected, with loadings for each item greater than .5. Thus, factor scores were estimated using the Bartlett method (Harman, 1976) .
Board advice-giving and board monitoring were also assessed with multi-item scales.
The wording of each question was developed from available qualitative research suggesting how top managers and directors describe CEO\board interaction and the board's role vis-a-vis management (e.g., "as a 'sounding board' on strategic issues") (Alderfer, 1986; Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) ; in addition, feedback from the pilot interviews was used to further improve the clarity and face validity of each question. For instance, advice-giving questions asked the extent to which the CEO solicited board input on corporate strategy, or the frequency of advice and council discussions with board members; monitoring questions asked the extent to which the board monitored strategic decision making or evaluated CEO performance (specific items are displayed in the Appendix). These measures assess monitoring and advice-giving at the board-level. We also conducted separate analyses of individual director involvement in monitoring and advice-giving; the results of these analyses were consistent with those reported below for the board.
Factor analysis was then applied to the survey items, again using the iterated principal factors method. A scree test showed two common factors, and promax rotation indicated that the monitoring and advice-giving items loaded on different factors as expected, with loadings for each item greater than .5 on one factor and less than .2 on the other. Furthermore, Cronbach's alpha was .92 for the monitoring scale and .89 for the advice-giving scale, again indicating acceptable reliability (Nunnally, 1978) . Accordingly, given encouraging evidence regarding inter-item reliability and discriminant validity (i.e., the factor loadings suggest that CEOs discriminate between the two constructs as expected), the monitoring and advice-giving factors were also estimated using the Bartlett method (Harman, 1976) .
Further analyses were conducted to assess the inter-rater reliability of these measures.
Specifically, we compared CEO and outside director responses by calculating kappa coefficients for the monitoring and advice-giving items. Kappa is a correlation coefficient which corrects for the expected level of correlation between raters (i.e., chance correlation). Values exceeding .75
are typically thought to indicate excellent agreement beyond chance, and values between .40 and .75 are considered indicative of fair to good agreement beyond chance (Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977) . The sample for this analysis included companies with a responding CEO and at least one responding director (N=188). Kappa coefficients exceed .75 for all survey items but one, which achieved .73, and the overall kappa is .82. Given these high levels of interrater reliability, it is perhaps not surprising that the hypothesized effects presented below were substantively unchanged when monitoring and advice-giving were measured with director responses rather than CEO responses, or vice-versa.
Independent Measures
Related board appointments in stable environments. Hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 predict the effects of individual directors' board appointments to other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm. Our measures of relatedness include the appointments of both inside directors and outside directors at the focal firm, 2 and they include both directional and nondirectional appointments held by these individuals on other boards. Non-directional appointments are created by directors who are not principally affiliated with the two boards that are connected (i.e., they serve as outside director at both firms), whereas directional appointments are created by directors who serve as a manager at the tied-to firm or the focal firm.
We measured relatedness across four different strategic dimensions which have been studied extensively in the strategy literature (e.g., Kim, 1989; Porter, 1986 Porter, & 1998 Rumelt, 1974) : First, board appointments related by product market were measured by developing a count variable equal to the number of director appointments to boards of companies that are in a primary business (i.e., as reflected in their 4-digit SIC code) similar to that of the focal firm, divided by the total number of appointments. Second, board appointments related by foreign market were measured by counting the number of appointments to boards of companies that have the same, primary foreign market as the focal firm, normalized by the number of appointments.
For example, two firms that reported France as their primary foreign market would exhibit a high degree of foreign market relatedness. In separate analyses we weighted appointments according to the difference between the focal firm's presence in each of its markets (i.e., as a portion of total sales) and the appointed-to firm's presence. The results presented below were substantively 2 Although independent directors may play a greater role than other directors in monitoring strategic decision making, and thus might benefit more from experience on other boards, we have essentially controlled for this distinction by including indicators of independence in the models (the specific indicators are discussed below). In any event, we conducted separate analyses in which (a) only the appointments of outside directors at the focal firm are included and (b) appointments of inside directors at the focal firm are included as controls. The results were substantively unchanged from those reported below.
unchanged demonstrating that they were robust to different measures of foreign market relatedness.
For the third dimension of strategic relatedness, we assessed diversification for the focal firm and other firms to which the director is connected using the entropy measure (Palepu, 1985) .
This measure takes into account the number of segments in which a firm operates and weights each segment according to its contribution to total sales. It is defined as follows:
where P is the sales (dollar value) attributed to segment i and ln(1/P i ) is the weight for each segment i, or the logarithm of the inverse of its sales. We calculated the absolute difference between diversification of the focal firm and diversification of each of the other firms to which the director is connected. The difference scores were then added and normalized by the total number of appointments. This figure was then subtracted from the highest value of diversification dissimilarity in the sample, so that higher values indicate greater relatedness.
Appointments related by degree of internationalization, our fourth dimension, were measured using a variation of the DOI composite measure validated by Sullivan (1994) . This measure gauges internationalization in terms of three important and theoretically distinct characteristics. The first characteristic, foreign sales, is calculated as a ratio of foreign sales to total sales and reflects a firm's dependence on sales to foreign markets. The second characteristic, foreign production, reflects a firm's reliance on owned foreign asset stocks and is measured by foreign assets as a percentage of total assets. As in the international business literature, the sales and asset characteristics address a firm's dependence on foreign consumer markets, and dependence on foreign production resources, respectively. The third characteristic, geographic dispersion, gauges the firm's number of country subsidiaries, as a percentage of highest number of country subsidiaries represented in our sample. Sullivan (1994) found that this characteristic provides a rough indication of the cultural variety associated with the previous two dimensions (Johansen & Vahlne, 1977) . All three DOI variables range theoretically from 0 to 1.
Together, the three different variables (foreign sales, foreign production, and geographic dispersion) are summed to form our composite measure of DOI. Therefore, our composite DOI measure has a theoretical range of 0 to 3. Consistent with Sullivan (1994) , we found these variables to demonstrate high inter-item reliability (alpha of .86), load on one factor with a high Eigenvalue and explained variance, and the composite measure to be normally distributed.
While there are multiple single-indicator measures of DOI (e.g., foreign sales to total sales, foreign assets to total assets, number of foreign employees to total employees, number of foreign subsidiaries), Sullivan (1994) has shown that these other measures are highly correlated. To gauge relatedness on this dimension of strategy, we calculated the absolute difference between the DOI of the focal firm and the DOI of each of the other firms to which the director is connected. Again, the difference scores were added and normalized by the number of appointments. This figure was then subtracted from the highest value of DOI dissimilarity in the sample to create an index of relatedness.
Hypotheses H2 and H3 predict the effects of board-level appointments to other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm on board behavior. To test these hypotheses we developed a set of aggregate variables for the relatedness of individual director appointments across all directors on the board. We did not exclude "redundant" appointments (i.e., additional appointments to the same other board), because multiple appointments to a related firm should provide a stronger conduit for expertise and information than a single appointment. For analyses conducted at the individual director-level, predicting the director's perceived ability to contribute, the variables are calculated for the particular director.
Heterogeneous board appointments in unstable environments. To test hypotheses H4
through H6, the heterogeneity of board appointments was measured in two ways. First, we assessed the extent to which an individual director's board appointments to other firms differed from the appointments of other directors in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, by calculating the absolute value of the difference between the director's relatedness score on a given strategic dimension and the average relatedness scores of other directors on the board (the measure of relatedness is defined above). High values indicate that a director's appointments differ from the appointments of other board members on a given dimension of relatedness. For example, if other directors have many appointments to firms with a very similar international presence, a director with more appointments to firms with a different international strategy from the focal firm will have a relatively high heterogeneity score on that dimension.
Finally, we developed a set of variables measuring strategic heterogeneity at the board level to assess the effect of board appointments on involvement in turbulent environments. We measured the extent to which a board's portfolio of director appointments is heterogeneous in its relatedness on a given dimension as (Σ |r i -ř| )/N, where r i is the relatedness score for director i , ř is the average relatedness for the board, and N is the number of board members. Higher values indicate greater heterogeneity in strategic relatedness; conversely, small values indicate that the firm's appointments are concentrated among firms that are either relatively similar, or relatively dissimilar to the focal firm on a given strategic dimension.
Other Measures
Environmental instability refers to the change rate of environmental factors relevant to strategic decision making (Duncan, 1972) , and is often a function of an industry's competitive dynamics (Chen, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel,1993) . Following Wiersema and Bantel (1993) , we measured environmental instability as changes in the industry concentration ratio. This ratio is calculated as the percentage of an industry's sales, at the four-digit SIC level, accounted for by the four largest firms. Large absolute changes in the concentration ratio are indicative of high environmental instability. Such change reflects "shifts in market share due to new entrants, exits, consolidations, and erosion of market share, thus they capture the dynamic nature of a firm's industrial environment" (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993: 493) . We observed change over the threeyear period prior to the survey date (i.e., 1992-1994) . Moreover, we used (monthly) stock price volatility as an alternative measure of instability (i.e., the average annual price coefficient of variation across all firms in the industry in a particular year Haunschild & Miner, 1997) . The results presented below were substantively unchanged demonstrating that they were robust to alternate measures of environmental instability.
Several control variables were also included in the models. Following Wiersema and Bantel's (1992) classification scheme for level of education, we controlled for directors' education level using number of years of schooling (cf., Kosnik, 1987) . A director's years of higher-level education may be indicative of certain knowledge pertinent to strategic decision making, which may affect their ability to contribute in potentially competing ways to their appoint to other boards. Similarly, more extensive general management experience could also be associated with directors' ability to monitor and advise management. Therefore, we also controlled for prior management experience, operationalized as the number of years during which a director had previously worked on a top management team. In addition, we also controlled for the number of functional areas in which directors have prior experience, because their ability to contribute may be enhanced if they have a broader base of prior experience (see Finkelstein, 1992) . Directors may acquire firm-specific expertise over time, therefore director tenure may influence the ability of directors to monitor and advise management. Thus, we controlled for the number of years directors had served on the board. Each of these four variables are averaged across directors in the board-level models.
We also controlled for the prior level of diversification and internationalization, since the complexities involved in managing highly diversified and/or international firms may tend to require greater monitoring and/or advice-giving capabilities (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1994) . For similar reasons, we controlled for firm size using the natural log of firm sales. In addition, we controlled for prior firm performance in models of board monitoring and advice-giving. An adaptation perspective would suggest that relatively poor firm performance could prompt CEOs to appoint directors with relevant appointments to other boards to enhance the board's monitoring and/or CEO advice-giving capability (Cyert & March, 1963) . Two recent studies provided evidence for a negative relationship between firm performance and board involvement in strategic decision making (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) . Accordingly, we included two measures of firm performance: return on equity (as an accounting-based measure) and market-to-book value (as a market-based measure).
Several studies have argued that CEOs co-opt the board into a passive role by appointing their personal friends to the board (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988) . Some researchers have also suggested that CEOs secure the passivity of outside directors simply by appointing them to the board (Alderfer, 1986; Boeker, 1992; Wade, et al, 1990) . Moreover, recent research has shown that top managers' openness to board advice is largely determined by the portion of the board composed of the CEO's personal friends and the portion of the board composed of directors appointed after the CEO (Westphal, 1999) . Thus, we controlled for these variables in the analyses (friendship ties are measured with questions in the CEO survey). We also included CEO ownership as a control variable in the monitoring and advice-giving models. Agency theorists have argued that incentives can provide an alternative or substitute for board monitoring, and incentives could also motivate top managers to seek advice from the board (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995) . Moreover, incentives could motivate other directors to monitor strategic decision making more actively and to offer their expertise on strategic issues (Bergh, 1995) . Thus, we controlled for director ownership in analyses of board monitoring and advice-giving. In addition, we controlled for board size in these models, given that large boards may be less cohesive, and thus less able to monitor decision making effectively (Johnson et al., 1993) , we also controlled for board size in models of directors' perceived ability to contribute to decision making because each director may see themselves as having less opportunity to contribute on large boards.
Prior studies have also examined whether board leadership structure is related to indicators of the board's ability to control management (e.g., Baliga et al, 1996; Finkelstein, 1992; Mallette & Fowler, 1992) . Thus, we controlled for leadership structure in models of board monitoring, using a dichotomous variable coded "1" if the CEO and board chair positions were separate and "0" otherwise. Although we did not expect board centrality to independently affect board involvement, in separate analyses we included different measures of centrality (e.g., in-degree centrality and the Bonacich measure [Wasserman and Faust, 1994] ), and these measures were consistently non-significant, while the hypothesized effects on board monitoring or advicegiving were unchanged. We also did not expect the hypothesized effects on advice-giving to be affected by the level of monitoring, or vice-versa, because the dependent variables are lagged and negatively correlated; separate analyses confirmed that the results were unchanged when the level of monitoring was included in the advice models, or vice-versa. (OLS) regression is the primary statistical technique employed. The entire sample was dichotomized at the median of the environmental stability measure, with those firms falling below the median accordingly classified as firms in relatively stable industries, and those falling above it classified as firms in relatively unstable industries. Thus, as presented in the following tables, separate sets of regressions were run for each sub-sample (i.e., stable versus unstable environments). As discussed further below, we also conducted separate analyses using the product term approach to testing interaction effects. Analyses of directors' ability to contribute to board discussions are conducted for the sample of responding directors, while analyses of board monitoring and advice-giving are conducted for all companies in the survey sample. * * * * * Insert Tables 1 and 2 About Here * * * * *
RESULTS
Results of the multiple regression analysis testing H1 support the prediction that related appointments would be positively associated with directors' perceptions of their ability to contribute to board discussions in stable environments (Table 3) . For example, the coefficients for product market, diversification, and internationalization relatedness were all positive and significant. And while the coefficient for foreign market relatedness was not significant, it was positive as hypothesized. Conversely, the results indicate that having more board appointments to firms with different strategies tends to reduce directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions. These results hold after controlling for complementarity in strategic relatedness, which is consistently unrelated to directors' perceived ability to contribute in stable environments. Several control variables significantly predicted the ability to contribute, including director education level, tenure on the board, and the number of functional areas in which the director had prior experience; board size was negatively related as expected.
A similar pattern of results provided robust support for hypotheses H2 and H3 (Table 3 ).
Hypothesis H2 predicted that in stable environments board appointments to other strategically related firms would be positively associated with the level of board monitoring of strategic decision making. Hypothesis H3 predicted that such appointments would be positively associated with the level of advice-giving on strategic issues. Three different kinds of strategic relatedness (product-market, diversification, and internationalization-relatedness) were positively associated with both monitoring and advice-giving. Conversely, having more board appointments to firms with unrelated strategies was negatively associated with both kinds of involvement. A separate analysis provided evidence that directors' perceived ability to contribute effectively mediates these relationships (i.e., when directors' ability to contribute is added to models of director monitoring and advice-giving, the effects of the relatedness variables become non-significant, while the coefficient for director ability is strongly and positively significant in both models, Baron & Kenny, 1986) . Again, as shown in the Table, the hypothesized effects are significant even after controlling for heterogeneity in strategic relatedness, which is consistently unrelated to either form of board involvement. * * * * * Insert Tables 3 and 4 About Here * * * * * Hypothesis H4 is the first test of our theoretical framework in unstable competitive environments. Specifically, in such environments we predicted that the more a director's board appointments complemented the appointments of other directors in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the greater would be the director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions. Table 4 shows the results of regression analyses predicting directors' perceived ability to contribute in unstable environments. Complementarity in strategic relatedness is positively related to directors' perceived ability to contribute for all four dimensions of corporate strategy, supporting hypothesis H4. At the same time, the results show that simple relatedness does not predict the ability to contribute.
The results for tests of hypotheses H5 and H6 are also presented in Table 4 . Consistent with our predictions for unstable environments, the greater the heterogeneity of directors' board appointments in terms of product market, diversification, and internationalization relatedness, the higher the level of board monitoring and advice-giving. Heterogeneity in foreign market relatedness is also marginally associated with advice-giving in such environments. These results hold after controlling for the simple relatedness of board ties, which was generally unrelated to either kind of involvement. Moreover, separate analyses again suggested that directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions mediated the effects of complementary appointments on director monitoring and advice-giving. Thus, the results consistently show that the strategic relatedness of board ties increases involvement in stable environments but not in unstable environments, while the opposite pattern emerged in unstable environments. We also conducted separate analyses using the product term approach to test interaction effects between environmental stability and the independent variables, and the interactions were significant, consistent with the split-sample findings.
To supplement the primary analyses of overall board involvement presented above, we conducted further analyses that focused on the board's involvement in either implementation or the consideration of new strategies using additional survey items (e.g., "To what extent does the board monitor the implementation of strategic decisions?"). In general, the relatedness of board ties was positively associated with reported involvement in implementation; it was negatively associated with advice-giving on new strategic alternatives in turbulent environments (this effect was not significant in stable environments). These results appear to further support our theoretical arguments as we would expect directors who have experience with related strategies to be more capable of contributing insight on implementation of the focal firm's current strategy.
In contrast, while directors who have experience with different strategies should be more capable of contributing insight about alternatives. Also, the non-significant effect of relatedness on advice about new strategic alternatives in stable environments is consistent with the view that strategic change is relatively less important in stable environments than in turbulent environments. Taken together, the implications of our results are discussed below.
DISCUSSION
Overall, the findings provided strong support for our theoretical framework. Empirical analyses yielded a consistent pattern of results suggesting that monitoring and advising behavior of directors depends on the strategic perspective and base of expertise provided by their appointments to other boards. For example, strategically related board ties were found to enhance board involvement in firms facing relatively stable environments, while strategically heterogeneous board ties were found to enhance involvement in firms facing relatively unstable environments. Therefore, it would appear that the strategic context of director appointments, not simply the presence or number of such appointments, is an important influence on corporate governance.
While there is a growing body of research on boards that recognizes corporate director appointments as an indicator of access to information network flows (Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer et al., 1993) , much of it has emphasized the number of interlocks (i.e., centrality) as indicative of the extent to which firms are integrated into a community of information. Critics of interlock research have emphasized the need to examine the "substantive context" of interlock appointments in order to understand their consequences (Nohria, 1992: 14; Pettigrew, 1992; Stinchcombe, 1990) . Our findings address this issue by showing how board interlock ties affect corporate governance to the degree that such ties are aligned with the strategic needs of the firm.
Thus, while the literature on interlocking directorates has tended to emphasize the firm's social context as an important determinant of organizational behavior, the findings of this study suggest that the effects of a firm's social structural context are moderated by its strategic context. Accordingly, this study extends network theories of corporate governance. The findings are consistent with a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement in which director ties to other boards provide direct strategic experience and indirect access to strategic information through social contact with other directors, which in turn can critically inform the knowledge structures used to monitor decisions or give advice on the focal board. Those knowledge structures can enhance the board's capability to contribute to strategic decision making if they address the primary strategic issues facing the firm (e.g., implementation of existing strategies in stable environments vs. the development of new strategies and implementation in turbulent environments); conversely, knowledge structures conditioned by board ties to other firms can reduce the board's capability to contribute to strategy if they do not match strategic contingencies facing the firm. This view is consistent with Granovetter's (1992) and Weick's (1995) social network embeddedness perspectives on organizational behavior, which suggest that individual action is conditioned by information spread through social structural relations, rather than strictly by the individual's personal decision making capabilities, or widespread social norms. In extending this perspective to explain board involvement in strategic decision making, our study pinpoints the specific kinds of network ties that can influence behavior (i.e., ties that provide relevant strategic knowledge).
Moreover, research on board power and control has typically focused on structural board independence as a critical determinant of the board's ability to protect shareholder interests.
Such research has also not addressed whether and when directors have the appropriate strategic perspective and knowledge to exercise control effectively. While the behavioral literature on boards has typically attributed low levels of director involvement to the social and political influence of top managers over outside directors (cf., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) , the findings of this study suggest that directors may also abstain from monitoring and advising management to the extent that they lack relevant strategic information and knowledge needed to contribute to the decision making process. As more boards acquire the structural power needed to influence the organization (Useem, 1993) , it becomes increasingly important to develop models of board effectiveness that predict whether they also have the ability to exercise their influence.
While agency-based views on boards of directors attribute lower levels of director involvement to the significant costs associated with monitoring activities (e.g., the time required to prepare for meetings) (Beatty & Zajac, 1994) , the perspective developed in this study suggests how and when the information and expertise directors gain from serving on other boards can permit them to economize on governance costs, by raising the "returns" from investing a given amount of time and attention in the monitoring and advising of management at a particular firm.
Our findings are consistent with the view that if directors' appointments to other boards provide them with relevant strategic information and expertise, and focus their attention on relevant strategic issues (e.g., strategic change vs. implementation), then directors are likely to realize positive sociocognitive "externalities" from their appointments to other boards. That is, investments in monitoring and advising at one firm provide directors with knowledge and perspective that raises the quality of their contributions at other firms with similar strategic priorities. Such externalities permit economies of monitoring and advising across firms.
Conversely, directors' appointments may provide them with inappropriate strategic information and focus their attention away from critical strategic issues facing the firm. Under those conditions directors may instead experience negative socio-cognitive externalities from their other board memberships, thus leading to diseconomies of monitoring and advising.
Some prior research on the diffusion of innovations has distinguished between a director's experience as an inside board member (i.e., at their home companies), and their experience as an outside director at other companies (sometimes referred to as "directional" and "non-directional", respectively [Palmer et al., 1993] ). For instance, Palmer and his colleagues suggested that the former, inside director ties may have stronger effects on diffusion than outside director ties, because managers are likely to devote more time than outside directors to implementing the innovations, leading to greater psychological commitment to them (Palmer et al., 1993; Palmer, Barber, Zhou & Soysal, 1995) . Similarly, director beliefs about corporate strategy might be influenced more by their experience as a top manager at their home companies than by their experience as an outside director at other firms. In order to test this possibility empirically, we conducted separate analyses in which the relatedness of manager-director ties was measured separately from the relatedness of outside director ties. The hypothesized effects were consistently supported for both sources of experience, and the effects of manager-director ties
were not consistently stronger than the effects of outside director ties.
Limitations. Although the findings of this study are consistent with a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement in which board ties to other firms help determine whether directors have the appropriate knowledge and perspective to contribute to strategic decision making, our empirical approach does not permit a direct examination of the cognitions that mediate these relationships. This limitation is shared by most empirical research in the top management team literature, which is also largely rooted in a sociocognitive perspective (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) . In addition, while we did measure the degree to which directors advised and monitored management, we were unable to assess the quality of the advice given, or the extent to which it ultimately improved firm performance.
Finally, the findings of this study may be less applicable to relatively small firms, where directors tend to have fewer board appointments at other companies.
Future research directions. These limitations suggest several directions for future research. Perhaps most importantly, while this study develops relatively direct measures of board behavior, research is still needed that directly measures the strategic expertise and perspective of corporate board members to assess how such cognitions mediate the effects of board ties on strategic decision making. For instance, researchers could examine whether directors who have strategically related board ties demonstrate more nuanced understanding of the requirements for implementing that strategy. Content analysis might be used to measure the complexity of director recommendations regarding information systems, reward systems, and other systems and structures needed to implement the strategy effectively. This approach has been used in the group decision making literature to measure the complexity of group member cognitions (Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang & Feld, 1992) .
In addition, to the extent that the strategic relatedness or heterogeneity of board ties predicts director behaviors, such behaviors may have particular implications for firm performance. For instance, our theoretical argument would suggest that heterogeneous board ties could enhance performance for firms operating in turbulent environments. In partial support of this view, Uzzi (1996) found that firms in the highly turbulent womens fashion industry were most likely to survive when they possessed a combination of strong and diverse ties to other organizations. Thus, future research should study whether or not the congruence of environmental stability and director appointments similarly affects performance differentials among firms.
Research might also examine whether firms with appropriate board appointments rely less on alternative control mechanisms. Johnson, et al. (1993) observed that boards influence firms either through strategic controls (e.g., board monitoring) or through financial mechanisms (e.g., managerial incentives). Therefore, future studies might examine whether the addition of board appointments that provide relevant strategic expertise lead firms to reduce their reliance on financial controls, thus minimizing the costs associated with such controls (i.e., the costs resulting from imposition of firm-specific risk on decision makers) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
Conversely, firms may rely more heavily on such financial controls where directors lack an appropriate strategic perspective and knowledge base from their appointments to other boards.
Finally, while governance practices differ across countries, reciprocal board appointments is one feature common to many (Demb & Neubauer, 1992) . However, because research in non-U.S. settings has emphasized the social, rather than strategic nature of reciprocal board appointments (e.g., Stokman, Zeigler & Scott, 1985) , there is an opportunity to extend the social psychological perspective developed here to studies of corporate governance in non-US settings.
For instance, given that there are markedly fewer restrictions on the types of board connections, (Davis, 1993) . However, the results of this study suggest the need to consider whether a director connects the firm with other organizations that can furnish relevant strategic knowledge and perspective, rather than simply focusing on the number of board seats the director already holds. For example, if a firm in a turbulent industry has a board that is comprised primarily of directors that sit on other boards with similar strategies, then such a board's capability to monitor and advise the firm may be enhanced considerably by appointing directors with appointments to firms that follow different diversification and internationalization strategies in different product and geographic markets.
In conclusion, the findings of this study suggest the value of developing socio-cognitive theories that address whether and when corporate leaders have the appropriate strategic knowledge and perspective to contribute to corporate governance. Moreover, while little rigorous empirical research has directly examined behavioral processes in CEO/board relationships, the findings also show the potential power of models that link the broader, social structural context in which boards are embedded, as well as the environmental conditions that surround them, with micro-behavioral processes that occur inside the "black box" of corporate boards. 
